Ilya Levin says fintech buyers must price capital needs, licensing risk and partner dependence alongside growth, then tie uncertain value to measurable results.
Fintech dealmaking is gaining momentum, but rising investment doesn’t make a fintech easier to value. The central challenge, in Ilya Levin’s view, is that buyers can treat regulated businesses as software companies and miss the capital constraints, partner dependencies and approval risks that shape their actual economics.
Global fintech investment reached $103.1 billion in the first half of 2026, up from $72.2 billion in the previous six months, according to KPMG data. M&A accounted for $67.9 billion across 394 deals, the largest share of investment. The pattern points to capital concentrating in fewer, larger transactions involving established business models. AI-focused fintechs attracted $21.4 billion, adding pressure on buyers to decide what future capabilities are worth today.
Levin has spent more than a decade working on acquisitions and corporate development at Sberbank, where he rose to managing director. He later advised investors seeking control of a US digital banking startup and now leads deal execution on the private equity team of a Central European Investment Group. A mathematics and economics graduate and CFA charterholder, he also serves on the 2026 Expert Council of the NextWave Awards, assessing Fintech Revolution and Sustainable Business Model nominations. In his approach, a large addressable market is only a starting point. The quality and durability of revenue matter more.
Revenue quality comes before market size
When Levin assesses a fintech, he starts by tracing where its revenue comes from and whether the business can acquire customers profitably. If winning a customer costs more than that customer generates, adding users can expand losses rather than create value. He therefore looks at unit economics and at revenue per user, which he finds more persuasive than user growth on its own.
He also maps the business’s dependencies. A fintech may depend on another company’s license, a single partner bank, a payment network or a major client. Those relationships can determine whether the product can operate, reach customers and keep generating revenue. A growing customer count tells only part of the story if the business depends on a partner that could leave or change its terms.
That scrutiny becomes especially important when the target is young. An established bank offers years of financial results and a balance sheet to examine. A startup fintech may have little operating history, so the buyer must focus more closely on the infrastructure and relationships behind the product. The first question is who holds customers’ money. Many fintechs lack their own license or hold only limited permissions, using partner banks for some or all services, including deposit-taking. The buyer needs to understand what would happen if that bank ended the relationship.
Payment networks, card issuers, technology providers and founders also belong in that dependency analysis. Levin recommends examining customer retention by cohort, along with acquisition cost, the time needed to recover that cost, and customer lifetime value. These measures help distinguish repeat use from growth driven by paid marketing that could fade when spending stops.
A license brings value and constraints
Pricing a licensed fintech with a software multiple can miss two defining features, Levin argues. A regulated business may have to hold capital that it cannot freely distribute, and a regulator becomes an additional party to the transaction, with the power to delay or prevent a change of control.
A license can save a buyer years of work entering a market, making it a valuable asset. It also brings capital requirements, compliance costs and the need for supervisory approval of a new owner. The approval process varies by market: some jurisdictions offer more predictable timelines and outcomes, while others make both difficult to forecast. Buyers need to account for that uncertainty in the price and the transaction structure.
Signing a purchase agreement does not mean the buyer can close immediately. The agreement needs to address the period while the parties wait for regulatory approval. Levin identifies several points to settle: a long-stop date that lets either side walk away, responsibility for costs if approval is refused, and the level of effort the buyer must make to secure approval. The parties should also establish when the buyer can exit if regulators impose unacceptable conditions, whether a break-up fee applies, how the business will be run before closing, and what price adjustments take effect if the waiting period stretches out.
These terms matter because a price negotiated at signing can stop reflecting the business or the risks by the time the deal is ready to close. Clear rules for the interim period help define who controls decisions and who bears the cost when approval takes longer than expected.
Choosing whether to buy, build or partner
For a large financial group weighing a new capability, Levin frames the decision around time. The buyer has to compare the cost of building internally, including the revenue or opportunity lost during the delay, with the premium required to acquire an existing business.
Buying is more compelling for capabilities that take years to assemble, such as a license, an established customer base or a team with rare skills. Building can make sense when the capability sits close to what the group already does. A partnership, including a white-label arrangement, offers another route: the institution can put a partner’s product in front of its own customers under its own brand.
That approach can bring a product to market faster than an internal build. It can also serve as a trial period before an acquisition, giving the institution a chance to test demand and learn how the partner operates. But Levin sees white-labeling as a difficult permanent solution for a large financial group. Customers may regard the service as the institution’s own, while the underlying technology remains under someone else’s control.
Acquisition has its own hidden cost: integration. A small digital company may lose the speed and independence that made it attractive once it is absorbed into a large bank. The buyer therefore has to weigh the value of the capability against the possibility that its operating environment will change after the deal.
Pay for demonstrated results, then structure the rest
AI can command a premium because buyers expect future benefits, but Levin’s approach is to separate proven value from the forecast. He would pay at closing for outcomes the technology already delivers, such as lower costs or improved fraud detection that appears in the company’s figures and can be checked during due diligence.
For value that depends on future performance, an earnout can connect part of the purchase price to agreed targets. A deferred payment on a fixed date still comes due regardless of results, so it does little to manage uncertainty about whether the promised gains will arrive. The earnout itself needs careful drafting: its metric should be precise and easy to measure, verifiable by an independent expert if the parties disagree, and difficult for either side to manipulate.
Levin compares a good term sheet to an algorithm: both should produce a clear outcome across the full range of possible inputs. The contract needs to anticipate situations the parties have not yet encountered, especially in fintech, where technology and regulatory conditions can shift during a transaction. A license condition might change, a partner bank could exit, or a key system might need replacement. The documents should say who decides what happens and who pays.
His outlook for consolidation follows the same logic. Large financial groups are likely to keep pursuing capabilities they cannot build quickly, particularly in AI, fraud prevention and compliance. Consumer apps with users but no profit may change hands at low prices, with buyers focused on specific assets such as a license, customer base, technology or team rather than paying a high multiple for the business as a whole. For buyers, the useful test is whether the acquired asset can deliver lasting value after approval, integration and partner risks are counted.
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